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Among the most significant developments in business cycle theory
in recent years have been the contributions to the theory of the in-
ventory cycle by Lloyd A. Metzler and others. By' combining the
basic tools of Keynesian macro-economic analysis with the hy-
pothesis of an "optimum" or "desirable" relation which firms en-
deavor to maintain between inventories and sales, these studies
have given us a plausible picture of why and how economic activity
tends to react with a cyclical pattern to an initial disturbance in
aggregate demand.
These studies, however, have typically rested on an aggregative
type of analysis and have not been too much concerned with ex-
ploring the micro-economic justifications for the assumption of a
"desired" stock-sales relation.It seems therefore appropriate to
ask whether this assumption, which plays an important role in the
above-mentioned models, can in fact be defended on the basis of a
close examination of the role of inventories in the economics of
the firm. The main purpose of this paper .is to attempt to answer to
this question, which has been sharply raised by Ruth P. Mack in
her contribution to this volume and in her related paper, "The Proc-
ess of Capital Formation in Inventories and the Vertical Propaga-
tion of Business Cycles."2Mack herself seems to be largely in-
clined to answer this question .in the negative.
As will soon become apparent, in analyzing the issues involved I
will be relying heavily on the contributions of another rapidly grow-
ing field of study which has been variously labeled as "engineering
economics," "operations research," "management science," etc.
As is well known, this field consists, broadly speaking, of the
Note: The present paper grows out of what was initially intended as a
comment to Ruth P. Mack's contribution to this volume, "Characteristics
of Inventory Investment: The Aggregate and Its Parts."However, it is
presented as a separate paper primarily because it is not a criticism of
Mack's analysis but rather an attempt to answer certain questions raised
in her analysis andina related contribution by her referred to intext.
'See the references quoted in Ruth P. Mack's paper, footnote 12.
2Review of Economics and Statistics, August 1953.
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application of analytical tools and the methods of statistical in-
ference to the solution of operating problems faced by business
firms and other organizations. These problems themselves revolve
largely around a question with which the traditional economist has
long been concerned, namely the question of how to get the most
for the least.However, the traditional economist has been in-
terested in these problems from a different point of view: in order
to construct models of economic behavior (economic theory) or to
evaluate the performance of a given set of institutions (welfare eco-
nomics) rather than to advise individual firms or organizations.
Since the contributors to this new area appear to have a strong
attachment to one or the other of the various names mentioned
earlier, I will try to avoid hurting anybody's feelings by making use
of a yet different name, viz, "normative micro-economics."3 This
name is, I feel, no less impressive than the others, but, being more
in line with the accepted nomenclature of the traditional areas of
economics, it may help to convey more immediately the relation of
the new field to those areas.
It happens that the problems of inventory management are among
those with which normative micro-economics has been, and still is,
particularly concerned.4 In attempting to answer the question posed
by Mack Iwilldraw on the outcome of these investigations as well
as on my own experience as a member of a research team presently
workingonproblemsofproductionscheduling andinventory
control.5
It may be noted in passing that the growth of normative micro-
economics has given rise to some heated discussions as to whether
this new area can, possibly contribute anything to the science of
economics in the traditional sense and whether, therefore, it should
be acknowledged at all as a branch of that science.Since in this
note I draw on normative micro-economics to answer a macro-eco-
nomic question, what follows may, perhaps, also throw some light
on the issues of that controversy.
'"Micro-economics" in thatit deals with individual units, such as
firms; "normative" because, like welfare economics, it purports to give
advice rather than to describe or explain behavior.
4For further information on some of these studies and some bibliographi-
cal references see, e.g. T. M. Whitin, "Inventory Control Research: a
Survey," Manageme4c Science, October 1954.
5The research in question is part of a larger project, "The Planning
and Control of Industrial Operations," under contract with the Office of
Naval Research. The other members of the team are Herbert A. Simon and
Charles C. Holt, whom I wish to thank for general advice and specific
suggestions in connection with the preparation of this paper.
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Before attacking the central problem, .1 should like to indulge in
a brief cEitical comment on one aspect of Mack's contribution. IVith-
out contradicting her general suggestion that we pay more attention
to the individual components of aggregate stocks, I believe that
many of the distinctions she is advocating are more apt to confuse
than to clarify a problem already complex enough. A specific ex-
ample may help to make this point clear.
As part of her contention that the effect of a given change in in-
ventories depends not only on the over-all size but also on its in-
ternal structure, Mack emphasizes the importance of distinguishing
between intended and unintended changes in stocks.For, she
argues, "the impact on business fluctuation of a given amount of
inventory investment [differsi depending on whether it is intended
[cr1 unintended" (see section 1).If an increase in inventories is un-
intended "of necessity ...thestimulating...effectof actual in-
ventory investment is reduced in proportion to the unintended por-
tion of the change" (section 4).
The passages quoted appear to involve a confusion between the
effect of previous changes in stocks on the previous level of ac-
tivity and the effect on future activity. As far as the first effect is
concerned, most economists—including presumably Mack—would
agree that the past increase in inventories, representing an addition
to the past level of production, will have helped to sustain the
level of activity while it lasted; this is so regardless of whether
the addition was wholly or partly unplanned.As for the effect of
the accumulation on future levels of activity there is, it is true, no
simple answer—but this is because past change in stocks is largely
irrelevant to future change in activity.This change will tend to
depend not on whether stocks went up or down (bygones are by-
gones, as economists are fond of saying) but on whether stocks are now
high or low relative to expected sales—and whether sales them-
selves are expected to be higher or lower than in the previous
period. And there is no reason to believe that either of these rele-
vant factors need bear a systematic relation to the previous change
in stocks per se.In the Metzler models we find, for instance, that
increases in stocks are followed roughly as frequently by increases
in output as by decreases. There is, of course, no harm in labeling
those increases in stocks which are followed by declining activ.ity
as "unintended increases" and those which are followed by in-
creasing activity as "intended increases"—but there is also no
evident advantage to be gained from these tautologies.There is
even less to be gained by saying, as Mack seems to be doing, that
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thereisindeed a relation between past changes in stocks and
future changes .in activity but that we must distinguish four types
of such changes as follows:
1. Activity will go up
a. When stocks have increased if sales are expected to rise
and stocks are (relatively) short (intended increase); or
b. When stocks have decreased if the expected behavior of
sales and their relation to stocks is as above (unintended
decrease).
2. Activity will go down
a. When stocks have increased if sales are expected to de-
cline and stocks are long (unintended increase); or
b. When stocks have decreased if the expected behavior of
sales and their relation to stocks is as above (intended
decrease).
But clearly the above fourfold classification is nothing but a com-
plicated and confusing way of saying that the future change in ac-
tivity does not depend on past changes in stocks at all, as is evi-
dent from the fact that the italicized clauses, containing references
to past changes in stocks, can be dropped with no meaningful
consequence.
I come now to the main issue—whether there is sufficient ground
for the macro-economic assumption of a desired stock-sales ratio.
Mack's doubts on this point seem to stem primarily from her ob-
servation that "the appropriate size of stocks is affected by factors
that do not focus directly on stocks but involve matters such as
convenience in procurement, efficient flow of work or service to
customers, and the expected prices of purchased materials" (sec-
tion 4)..1 find myself in complete agreement with this interesting
observation:if anything, I would go one step further and submit
that very nearly all the decisions that finally result in the holding
of stocks are really based on considerations other than the mainte-
nance of a given relation between stocks and sales..1 propose to
argue, however, that in spite of all this—and abstracting from the
effect of price expectations—it is probably still useful, for the
purpose of aggregative analysis, to proceed as though firms tried
in fact to maintain a stable relation (though not necessarily a con-
stant ratio)6 between stocks and sales.
6The assumption that the desired relation is one of proportionality is
convenient (in that it simplifies the mathematics) but not essential for the
models under consideration. On this point, see Lloyd A. Metzler, "Com-
ment," Conference on Business Cycles, National Bureau of Economic Re-
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In order to support this statement I propose to examine briefly
four major factors that justify, i.e. make profitable, the holding of
inventories.
Procurement Costs
A first important reason for holding stocks arises when there are
economies of bulk procurement, i.e. when the cost per unit is a
decreasing function of the number of units procured simultaneously.
Such economies are extremely common whether the item is procured
internally or through outside purchases; they may result, e.g., from the
presence of fixed costs (costs of placing and processing orders, or
setting up costs) or from quantity discounts in purchasing or trans-
porting the item, etc. As a result of the declining cost per unit, it
will be generally profitable (in the sense that it will reduce the
cost of sales) to procure the item in lots, although this method of
procurement will result in the holding of inventories. The average
amount of such holdings per unit of time wiii depend on the size of
the lot, the precise nature of the dependence being determined by
the nature of the procurement and demand conditions.If, for in-
stance, there were no lead time, i.e. if a lot could be procured in-
stantaneously, and sales occurred at a constant rate, the stock on
hand would fluctuate between a full lot and zero and the average
amount held would represent half an "optimum" lot.But precisely
because (1) the average stock is related to the lot size and (2) the
holding of stocks is a source of costs (interest, spoilage, obso-
lescence, cost of storage facilities), there arise definite limits to
the size of the optimum lot that it pays to procure even if the pro-
curement cost per unit should fall indefinitely.Beyond a certain
point the reduced cost per unit is more than offset by the increasing
Cost of storage.In fact it will be found that in general the optimum
size of the lot, and therefore the optimum average amount of in-
ventories, is related to the rate of sales and tends to increase with
it.This conclusion is supported by the numerous "optimum lot
size formulas" which have been worked out with mathematical
techniques, but its common sense can readily be grasped without
any need for higher mathematics.7
search, 1951, pp. 325—333; T. Whitin, Theory of Inventory Management,
Princeton University Press, 1953, Chap. 5; and Ragnar Nurkse, "The
Cyclical Pattern of Inventory Investment," Quarterly Journal of Econom-
ics, August 1952.
7For a given rate of sales, the optimum lot is such that the marginal
inventory cost of carrying a larger lot would just more than offset the
marginal saving per unit of time from increasing the size of the lot.But
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The "average stock" of which we have been speaking is the
average of a given item over time. But clearly, when we deal with
a large number of firms (or of products within a firm) whose cycles
of orders occur at random, a stable relation between average stocks
and sales for each individual item over time will tend to generate,
for any given (constant) rate of sales, a stable relation between
aggregate stocks and aggregate sales at each point of It is
interestingto note that this stable relation between (optimum)
stocks and sales is not at all the result of a direct attempt on the
part of the decision-maker to keep at all times in stock a certain
number of weeks' supply of any given item.Quite the contrary, for
any given item the stock-sales ratio will fluctuate continuously and
only attain sporadically, and in transition, the average value.No
direct significance attaches to this average ratio for each item
which is purely a "statistical" result of decisions focusing not on
this ratio but on cost minimization. Nonetheless, from the point of
view of describing the behavior of broad aggregates, the result of
the "procurement cost" motive is precisely the same as though
firms were in fact trying to maintain stocks at a certain optimum
level varying with sales.
It may be objected that these conclusions are based on mathe-
matical formulas which firms may not know or apply.There is in
fact evidence that some of these formulas are known and applied.
However, this is beside the point, just as it is beside the pQint to
say that the theory of monopoly does not apply to reality because
entrepreneurs do not know what is meant by marginal cost and
marginal revenue.One would not expect a hardware retailer,
whether or not he ever heard of optimum lot size formulas, to order
a single screw of some standard type whenever he sold one, al-
though this would reduce his inventories, or to order power drills
by the carload although this would reduce transportation costs per
this marginal saving per unit of time is equal to the marginal saving per
unit multiplied by the number of units demanded per unit of time.Hence
if the rate of sales increases, the marginal saving per unit of time must
increase and presently exceed the marginal inventory cost. Clearly, to re-
establish the marginal conditions, the size of the lot will generally have
to be increased.
emotherwords the stability of the time series average of the com-
ponents of the "ensemble" generates a stable cross-section ratio of total
stocks to total sales, the ratio in question representing an average of the
time series average for each component weighted by the contribution of
each item to total sales.It will be noted that the process described is in
the nature of an ergodic process, in which the cross-section average co-
incides with the phase average of each component of the "ensemble."
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unit.In other words, if we are willing to assume that firms endeavor
to follow procedures which keep costs down—and there is no real
reason for questioning such a tendency_we may expect to find
that in their quest for cost saving (which may partly consist in the
imitation of more successful firms) they will behave in ways which
are not very different from those we can deduce from our formulas.
Smoothing of Production
A second important reason for holding stocks is to be found
where production occurs in a Continuous process but the unit cost
of production is an increasing function of the rate of production or
of variations in the rate of production.Under the postulated con-
ditions—and indications are that such conditions are again quite
common—it will frequently be profitable to keep production rela-
tively stable in spite of fluctuations in sales, although this will
result in the accumulation of inventories duiing slack seasons to
be followed by liquidation during peak seasons. The factors that
tend to control the behavior of stocks under these conditions have
been examined at some length in another paper.9The results of
that analysis indicate that if the only source of variation in sales
were the (constant) seasonal, then stocks on hand at any given
point of the year, and average stocks during the year, would tend
to hear a definite and stable relation to the rate of sales.They
further indicate that this stable relation may be regarded as the
equivalent of the "desired" or optimum relation hypothesized in
the inventory cycle models, in the sense that whenever the actual
relation between inventories and (expected) sales is below the
optimum relation, production will be high relative to sales, and
vice versa.In other words firms will tend to behave as though they
were .in fact trying to maintain the normal relation or to re-establish
it,if disturbed by errors in sales expectations.But once more,
this behavior is not the result of a direct endeavor to have on hand
a certain number of months' sales but rather the indirect result of
the quest for an economical pattern of production.
9Franco Modigliani and Owen H. Sauerlender, "Economic Expectations
and Plans of Firms in Relation to Short-Term Forecasting," Short-Term
Economic Forecasting, Studies in Income and Wealth, Volume Seventeen,
Princeton University Press for National Bureau of Economic Research,
1955,pp. 261—361.See also Charles C. Holt, Franco Modigliani, and
Herbert A. Simon, "Linear Decision Rules for and Employment
Scheduling," Managment Science, October 1955.
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Expected Changes in Prices
The above two reasons for holding stocks, it will be noted, are
basically unrelated to uncertainty of future demand; they would
arise even if the future course of demand over the relevant horizon
were known with certainty. A third reason for holding stocks even
under certainty and, it would seem, the only important remaining
one,1° is to be found in the expectation of forthcoming changes .in
prices.An increase (decrease) in the future price of a purchased
item is equivalent to a negative (positive) storage cost amounting
to the percentage rate of change of the price. Hence if prices are
expected to rise at a rate sufficiently high to offset the normal
storage cost, the cost of sales can be reduced by procuring now the
quantity that will be required to satisfy the demand over some fu-
ture span of time—the length of the span depending on storage
costs and on the expected behavior of prices.11Here again the re-
suit will be the holding of stocks equal to a certain number of
months' requirements even though the decision was not at all
focused on this objective.
Uncertainty andLeadTime
Uncertainty about future demand has been frequently regarded as
the only significant reason for holding stocks.As we have just
seen, this position is definitely untenable. As a matter of fact, one
can go one step further and argue that if any needed item could be
procured instantaneously at no extra cost, uncertainty of demand
would not per se explain the holding of stocks.It is only in the
presence of lead time, i.e. when an interval of time (possibly of
uncertain length) elapses between the ordering of an item and its
delivery, that uncertainty of demand becomes a separate, and
doubtedly very important, reason for holding stocks.In order to
avoid the undesirable consequences of inability to satisfy demand
(interruptions in production process, loss of potential profits,
loss of customers' goodwill, etc.) it becomes economical to place
'°See, however, footnote 13.
111f we denote by p(T) the price expected to rule T units of time from
the present, and by r1thecost of carrying a dollar of inventory per unit of
time, it is readily seen that it will pay to cover future requirements now,
if and only if, p(1) > p(O) (1 +and the number of time units for which re-
quirements should be covered is given by that value of T such that p (0>
p (0) (1 + fort < T, while p(T + 1) < p(0)(l + r,)T +1•(The results
given apply to the case where T varies discretely; similar conditions can
be established if T varies continuously, or with different assumptions
about the form of the inventory carrying costs.)
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orders when the stock on hand (plus that already on order) is some-
what larger than the quantity that .is regarded as most likely to be
demanded over the lead time. As a result, by the time the order is
filled there will still be, on the average, some inventory on hand—
the so-called buffer stock.It is fairly clear, even without a rigor-
ous mathematical argument, that the "optimum" buffer will gener-
ally tend to increase with the rate of sales; furthermore this buffer
can be expressed, and frequently is, as a certain number of weeks'
sales. Once more the avowed purpose of the decision-maker is not
that of maintaining a certain constant relation between inventories
and the rate of sales, but that of procuring efficiently and avQiding
run-outs.'2As a matter of fact the stock of any given item will
fluctuate continuously over time between certain limits.The aver-
age optimum inventory, however—roughly half an optimum lot plus
buffer—.will again hear a definite relation to the rate of sales. The
resulting aggregate behavior will be much the same as though firms
were trying to establish and maintain at each point of time a certain
relation between stocks and sales.'3
We thus emerge from an analysis of the major reasons for holding
stocks with the following conclusion.While the immediate goal of
decisions affecting the size of stock is usually not that of main-
taining the stock of any given item in a certain desirable relation
with sales, yet, for the purpose of aggregative analysis it may not
he a bad approximation to assume, as has been done in recent in-
ventory models, that firms endeavor to establish and maintain such
a relation—modified, however, by price expectations.While this
relation may not be desired per se, it performs the same role as if
it were desired; perhaps one might refer to it as a "dummy" or
"quasidesired" relation.
'21n some instances firms report carrying a buffer equal to a certain
number of weeks' requirements in order to be able to continue to operate
for such a length of time even if the flow of supplies dries up completely
as a result of special circumstances, such as strikes.This motive for
holding inventories may well be classified under the beading of (uncer-
tain) lead time; its quantitative importance is hard to assess.
'3One reason for holding stocks that does not readily find its place in
our fourfold classification is where the item can be procured (advantage-
ously) only at certain specified points or periods of time, e.g. nonstorable
crops requiring further processing, seasonal goods.This situation is
analogous to simple lead time in that orders placed are not filled instan-
taneously except possibly at the "appropriate" times.Here the quantity
procured at each permissible point will tend to exceed the demand "ex-
pected" up to the next permissible point by a suitable buffer, and the
average stock will be in the order of half the expected demand plus the
buffer.
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The reasoning leading to the conclusion stated in the previous
paragraph, incidentally, may help to explain the apparently frequent
reference to stock-sales ratios in business practice.Inasmuch as
"optimal" individual production or procurement decisions ithplya
fairly definite relation between aggregate inventories and sales,
the aggregate stock-sales relation becomes a useful short cut ap-
proximation or rule of thumb to determine whether correct individual
decisions have been made and are being made.One might expect
that such rules would tend to be used particularly by higher levels
of management .in judging the performance of, or in setting broad
rules for, the operating levels of management. Being primarily con-
cerned with an over-all view of the operations and with their f
nancial aspects, these higher level8 of management may tend to
look at inventories as an aggregate which absorbs funds and must
therefore be held down. Needless to say, rules of thumb frequently
acquire, through repeated use, an independent status and become,
to some extent, ends in themselves.
Returning to the problem of macro-economic relations, our analy-
sis further indicates that the quasidesired relation between stocks
and sales is such that the desirable amount of stocks will tend to
increase with sales.Besides the rate of sales, the rate of utili-
zation of capacity is also likely to exert some influence. For when
utilization increases, lead times will tend to lengthen and become
more uncertain—with a Concomitant increase in desirable buffer
stocks.Similarly there will tend to arise an added incentive to
adopt patterns of production that smooth seasonal variations in
sales, with a concomitant increase in "smoothing" stocks; indeed
when demand is high relative to existing capacity, the accumula-
tion of inventories in the slack season may become the only way of
satisfying the over-all demand.
A third factor affecting the desired relation between stocks and
sales, which has been much stressed in traditional economics, is
represented by variations in the cost of money—or in the availa-
bility of funds—which affects the optimum amount of inventories
through the (opportunity) cost of holding inventories.'4While this
"The influence of the availability of funds on the optimum level of
physical inventories reflects partly the fact that money itself is a com-
modity of which the firm must hold an "optimum inventory." Because of
the serious penalty usually attached to running out of money when it is
demanded, the firm must plan to hold on the average a safety buffer, i.e.
an amount and above the balance of most likely disbursements minus
most likely receipts.With a given fixed stock of working capital, the
optimum balance in distributing this stock between various physical in-
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factor may have been overstressed, its significance cannot be dis-
missed, at least pending further evidence.Finally the desirable
relationbetween stocks and sales may well undergo gradual
changes over time as a result of merchandizing and technological
change, changes in the composition of output, etc.Actually most
of these inferences appear to stand up well against the historical
record, although it is not possible to pursue this point further here.
In summary then, the macro-economic assumption of a desired
stock-sales relation appears to receive support from our analysis
of the role of inventories in the economics of the firm. At the same
time it should be recognized that this relation might be subject to
gradual changes over time and also to systematic short-run changes
as a result of variations in the level of demand relative to capacity
and accompanying changes in lead time, of price expectations, and
possibly of variations in interest rates.
To be sure, the above analysis does not enable us to say just
how precise the desired relation between stocks and sales might be
or just how fast any deviations would tend to be corrected.In this
connection Mack'snotionofpermissive versusintended,i.e.
planned, changes in stock may well be useful, although I feel that
she has rather blurred her useful concept by including under "per-
missive" or "passive" changes those changes in stocks that result
from "business objectives that focus on other matters than the ap-
propriate size of stocks ..." (section4).It seems more useful to
regard the desirable level of stock as the level appropriate after
taking into account all of the systematic reasons that justify the
holding of inventories.Even so itis quite conceivable that the
desirable relation between stocks and sales might take the form of
a "band" rather than of a "line"; a permissive variation would
then be one which leaves stocks within the acceptable band.I
doubt that the band in question is so large that it cannot be use-
fully approximated by a line, especially when dealing with appro-
priately broad aggregates.Accordingly I would be inclined to re-
place the hypothesis of a band of indifference with the hypothesis
ventories and cash (or very liquid assets) may be obtained by making a
charge for the use of money representing the internal opportunity cost, or
marginal productivity, in all alternative uses.As long as the firm has
access to outside funds at a stated "market" interest rate, the internal
or opportunity cost will coincide with the market or external rate.In the
presence of capital rationing, however, the external rate may be lower
than the internal one andthemovements of the external rate need not bear
any close relation to. those of the internal rate or opportunity cost of
money, which is the relevant factor controlling the optimum physical
stock-sales relation.
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that the discrepancy between actual and desirable inventories tends
to be corrected at a certain rate, which may itself depend on the
magnitudeof the discrepancy.15This formulation bears some
similarity to Mack's hypothesis in that the magnitude of the adjust-
ment per unit of time would depend on the "distance" between the
actual and the desired relation and might therefore be negligible
when this distance is sufficiently "small." Clearly this isan area
in which further research can throw much useful light.
Another area for further investigation whose importance is high-
lighted by Mack's contribution is the whole area of expectations.
The notion of a "desired" relation, whose usefulness I have tried
to defend, applies to the relation between stocks and expected
sales—not past sales.In the inventory models to which I have re-
ferred, expected sales have been assumed to equal, or at most to
hear some mechanical relation to, past sales.This may well be
less than satisfactory, as my own work in progress in this area
seems to suggest.Much remains to be learned as to when, why,
and how significantly expected sales may differ from past experi-
ence and what recent experience is relevant in this context. Equally
vexing are the many questions connected with expectations of price
changes. When are these expectations sufficiently definite to alter
the normal desired relation between stocks and sales?In what
kinds of business are such deviations likely to be too important to
be safely neglected? And what generates these price expectations?
Here are but some of the many empirical questions that remain to
be answered—and the sooner the better.
COMMENT
RUTH P. MACK, National Bureau of Economic Research
Franco Modigliani's paper raises a question of method rather than
fact.I can detect little or no difference in the fundamentals of
Modigliani's picture of "business reasons for holding inventories"
'3The hypothesis rests on the consideration that production and pro-
curement decisions are typically being made almost continuously and
therefore the level of inventories may be made to move gradually in the
desired direction without necessarily taking any very drastic and dramatic
decisions; drastic ad hoc decisions may, however, take place when in-
ventories are seriously out of line.For some attempts at measuring the
"speed of adjustment" see also my joint paper with 0. H. Sauerlender,
quoted above. The role of the notion of speed of adjustment in relation to
business cycle models is discussed more extensively in my comment to
the paper of Bert G. Hickman, included in this volume.
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and mine as drawn in my paper in this volume, in the article to
which Modigliani refers, and in the study of the shoe, leather, hide
sequence that is parent to both.
True, Modigliani's paper is written as if the factors that cause or
result in a stable relation between inventories and output were, in
his judgment, a great deal more important in the totality of influ-
ences and behavior bearing on stocks than they are in mine. But I
think this difference lies in his presentation and summaries, not in
his basic descriptions.Were Modigliani fully to assess the im-
plications of the facts he cites as relevant, our picture of the real
world of inventory investment would appear closely similar.
For one thing be distorts my position when, on page 497, he
quotes a statement made in connection with one type of situation—
one resulting in "passive" stock change—as my contention about
stocks as a whole.I have been at some pains to indicate that the
appropriate size of some stocks, especially those carried by re-
tailers, does focus directly on stocks, and that stock of no sort can
be permitted to range indefinitely wide of the level appropriate to
the volume of business.On the other hand Modigliani's argument
understates the implications of other factors that he as well as I
believe influence the size of stocks.For example he discusses
the impact of physical problems of procurement in a footnote (13);
he fails to point out that the proper size of buffer stocks is a func-
tion of fluctuations in the length of delivery periods as well as of
their average length (p. 503); he treats Expected Changes in Prices
and ignores in the summary statement in the last sentence one as-
pect of his own argument which points out that the number of
weeks' suppiy that it is desirable to carry will vary with the ex-
pected rate of change in prices. Be couches the entire argument in
terms of desired stock and thus further subdues the factors that
pull away from a steady stock-sales relationship.
Our differences, then, do not lie in how business behavior is
viewed, but elsewhere.Modigliani says "past change in stocks is
largely irrelevant to future change in activity." He says that pas-
sages in my paper involve a confusion between "the effect of
previous changes in stocks on the previous level of activity and
the effect on future activity."But my remarks cannot be excused
on the grounds of confusion.They constitute an assertion that
past changes in stocks, viewed in an ex ante framework, are rele-
vant to future changes in activity. Indeed when properly understood
and analyzed, past changes in stocks help to foretell future changes
in stocks and in activity in general.
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But to serve this purpose, knowledge of total stock change alone
will not suffice.It is necessary to know how parts of the total
have changed—parts reacting to each major constellation of situ-
ations capable of causing different time patterns in stocks.It is
necessary to understand the business motives that control these
stocks and how they operate under actual business conditions. Ob-
viously there is no end to knowledge of this sort. The end must be
imposed; the question is where to impose it.
For the purpose of understanding the behavior of economic aggre-
gates, Modigliani claims that it can be imposed at the point where
themajor influence—the desired link between stocks and the
volume of output—is accounted for.The other factors that influ-
ence the behavior of stocks cause the desired relation between
stocks and sales to take the form of a band rather than a line. But
he says, "I doubt that the band in question is so large that it can-
not be usefully approximated by a line, especially when dealing
with appropriately broad aggregates."
It may be that a judgment of this sort underlies the previous ob-
jection to my interest in the behavior of stocks as an indicator of
future activity. For if the relation is sharp—a line not a band—then
future stocks are determined by future output and there is no need
to try to extract the bearing of past changes in stocks on future
activity.
In any event it is clear that the real difference in our evaluations
lies in a judgment about the width of the band.More particularly,
since I have no disagreement with Modigliani's basic description
of how stocks change, our difference rests in an evaluation of the
relevance of the width of the band to macro-economic analysis.
Bere again a distinction is necessary: I agree that the band may be
approximated by a line (with minor modifications) in analysis of
long-term trendsin stocks.But in the analysis of short-term
changes of a cyclical or subcyclical order, I differ sharply with the
notion that the range may be ignored.
I base this judgment on two sorts of considerations.First, in-
formationabout business objectives and actionsindicatethat
stocks respond to influences the time patterns of which do not
necessarily parallel output, although they may do so.An example
is the influence of market expectations of many sorts, including
expected change in prices.'
'For evidence in time series of the impact of these factors, see Ruth
Mack, Consumption andBusinessFluctuations: A Case Study of the Shoe,
Leather, Hide Sequence, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1956,
Chapters 12 and 14.
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Second, time series actually show a wide short-term variation in
average or incremental ratios betweew aggregate output and aggre-
gate stocks. The instability of the ratio is evident in time series
for gross national product and total stocks measured in dollars of
constant purchasing power.Since we know that the ratio of total
GNP to total stocks has a cyclical pattern, it is preferable to com-
pare ratios for increments.Approximate constancy in these rela-
tionships is one fairly flexible way of defining stability (rather than
constancy) in the ratios of output and stocks proper. To this end,
change in GNP in constant prices from one year to the next may be
compared with change in end-of-year stocks.2GNP and stocks
change in the same direction in all but two years from 1930 through
1953, excluding the war years 1942—1945.But the positive ratios
range from 20.7 to 0.7. The average for all ratios is ±6.4 and their
average deviation from the mean, ± 5.3. To get an idea of what this
range implies, I calculate change in stock by multiplying GNP by a
constant incremental ratio—the median, ÷3.6.Comparing these
hypothetical changes under a constant ratio with actual change
year by year, we find that whereas actual annual changes averaged
$3.5 billion, the errorofestimating change on the basis of a con-
stant incremental ratio averaged $2.6 billion.Apparently most of
the actual change in stock remains unexplained after change as-
sociated with maintaining a constant incremental output-stock ratio
has been taken into account.The unexplained portion would be
still higher were quarterly figures. used, and certainly the relation-
ship for three-month periods is relevant to the analysis of cyclical
or subcyclical fluctuation.I interpret these figures as throwing
the burden of proof on anyone who claims that experience shows
that output-stock relationships may be thought of as stable in the
context of short-term macro-economic analysis.
If then the band is broad, not narrow, knowledge of the factors
that cause changes in stocks must penetrate to the level of explain-
ing the cause of divergence from a stable relation to output—ob-
jectives that link desired stocks to prices or other market tensions,
to patterns of availability of goods, to the perception of error in
unintended change and the manner in which it is reversed, or to the
tolerance, at least for a wh.ile, of passive change.
2Moses Abramovitz's analysis raises a question as to whether this re-
lationship might be more stable if change in stocks were lagged. Inspec-
tion of the two time series suggests that the most stable relationship for
the period would apply to the comparison as stated in the text, which
implies a short lag.
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This last distinction, which involves the notion of passive stock
change, I have discussed in the paper in this volume. Bert S. Hick-
man thinks that the distinction complicates more than it informs.
We need, he says, to test the two hypotheses already
the stable output-stock relation and the price-expectation influence
on stock—not dream up more hypotheses.But the two hypotheses
are not in my judgment alternatives but supplements. What is more,
and here is an aid in testing, their relative roles must differ for
different sorts of stocks.Further, were their relevance tested for
still other stocks—finished stocks of manufacturers, for example,
or total stocks of those manufacturers holding most of their stocks
in finished form—their influence would be largely denied.The
reason is that these stocks are what I have called passive for wide
margins of variation.True, as Hickman points out, their change,
sinceitis comprehended in the over-all management plan, may
properly be called intended. But an essential to the process of in-
vestigation is the making of fruitful distinctions. For these stocks
the word intention does not describe the essence of the business
situation as it does for stocks whose size is subjected to close and
incessant management purview. Also, at any given time, change in
these passive stocks is often in the opposite direction from in-
tended change in other stockpiles.'Nevertheless it is not unin-
tended in the sense that it will be promptly corrected, although it
will often parallel unintended change in other stockpiles.The
point is that stocks subject to passive change behave differently
and for different reasons than when change is primarily either in-
tended or unintended.
The behavior of all stocks is, in other words, an arithmetic sum
of the behavior of a number of classes of stocks that respond to
different influences in different proportions.Since the quantitative
relations among the several classes is highly variable in the short
run, a test put to the total can at best be a muddy test and at worst
no test at all.
The particular point at issue here is whether the category of
passive stock change is a useful distinction that can earn its keep
—the cost of complication.Only the future can surely tell, for
without much more study judgments are necessarily subjective.I
have tried to argue for it.I might add that I believe the concept is
important for the study of transmission of business fluctuation from
one enterprise to another.Passive stocks are an insulating sub-
stance for a and we need to know more about where this sub-
stance is found, how much there is of it at each type of locale, and
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the varying circumstances under which passive change becomes un-
intended and therefore reversed.Conceptual delineation is a pre-
requisite to investigation.Even at a glance it seems clear that
the notion of passive stock-change helps to elucidate the behavior
of stocks in 1931 and 1932, and it helps in understanding why re-
tailers' stocks align with sales more promptly than manufacturers'
stocks, or why finished-materials stocks behave so differently from
stocks of purchased materials.
In short, if the concept helps to describe reality but confuses
theory, the difficulty must lie with the theory not with the concept.
For it does not follow that because it is a bad thing for a theory to
be more complicated than necessary, it is a good thing for a theory
to be less complicated than necessary.The question is what is
necessary, and the answer concerns the critical facts that need to
be explained. Strong simplification is prerequisite to useful thought
and thereforeall but the essential matters must be discarded.
Nevertheless there is a minimum that must be comprehended.The
minimum differs with the problem; the critical facts about inven-
tories are one thing in the context of long-term trends and another
in the context of short-term fluctuations.In any context the judg-
ment as to which are the essential facts is based in part on em-
pirical evidence. Study of the actual world also helps to delineate
a theory sufficiently specific to aid in explaining the facts.I do
not claim to have described properly, but I do claim that description
of the order of complexity that I have undertaken is necessary to a
good theory of inventories.
This is a personal judgment in part, and others may not share it.
Starting with a desire for simplicity and generality, every investi-
gator who wishes to explain how things happen (at the level at
which explanation serves a useful purpose) is usually forced, often
against his esthetic predilections, to admit complicating factors
and to make complicating distinctions. These decisions to include
or exclude constitute the investigator's central vision, his basic
hefting of the problem with which he deals.The decisions must
not be made carelessly or in response to some early enchantment.
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